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Abstract. HB+ is a lightweight authentication scheme, which is secure
against passive attacks if the Learning Parity with Noise Problem (LPN)
is hard. However, HB+ is vulnerable to a key-recovery, man-in-the-middle
(MiM) attack dubbed GRS. The HB+DB protocol added a distance-
bounding dimension to HB+, and was experimentally proven to resist the
GRS attack.
We exhibit several security flaws in HB+DB. First, we refine the GRS
strategy to induce a different key-recovery MiM attack, not deterred by
HB+DB’s distance bounding. Second, we prove HB+DB impractical as
a secure distance-bounding (DB) protocol, as its DB security-levels scale
poorly compared to other DB protocols. Third, we refute that HB+DB’s
security against passive attackers relies on the hardness of LPN; moreover,
(erroneously) requiring such hardness lowers HB+DB’s efficiency and se-
curity. We also propose a new distance-bounding protocol called BLOG.
It retains parts of HB+DB, yet BLOG is provably secure and enjoys better
(asymptotical) security.
1 Introduction
In authentication protocols, a prover (e.g., an RFID card) must prove its
legitimacy to a verifier (e.g., an RFID reader). The protocol is correct if
legitimate provers (almost) always authenticate. Security is expressed in
terms of impersonation resistance: a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attacker be
able to authenticate with only negligible probability.
The HB protocols. HB and HB+ are well-known authentication proto-
cols [11,13], suitable for resource-constrained devices. HB+ is impersonation-
secure against passive attackers, if the learning parity with noise (LPN)
problem [2] is hard [13]. However, an active MiM can successfully imper-
sonate HB+’s provers, e.g., through GRS attacks [9] (see Section 2.3.).
Distance bounding . Distance-bounding authentication (DB) protocols [7,8]
are authentication schemes that moreover aim to deter impersonation at-
tacks mounted via relaying. To this end, the verifier uses a clock to measure
the roundtrip time (RTT) during certain exchanges. If these RTTs exceed
a given proximity bound, then the verifier rejects the prover. Besides imper-
sonation security, secure DB must thwart attacks to proximity checking,
as described in Section 2.1.
The HB+DB scheme [15] . HB+DB addressed GRS attacks against HB+
by adding a proximity-checking countermeasure to that protocol. HB+DB’s
effectiveness was assessed by practical experiments, and its limited worst-
case security analysis was expressed in terms of LPN-noise levels [15]. In
this paper, we present failings of HB+DB, linked both to practice (e.g., DB-
security scaling poorly), and to theory (e.g., refute claims that HB+DB’s
security against passive attackers relies on LPN-hardness).
Our contributions. Our results are as follows.
DB insecurity. In Section 3.1, we show how the LPN noise demanded by [16]
yields very successful attacks, despite using many proximity-checking rounds.
Active MiM insecurity. Section 3.2 exhibits a key-learning, MiM attack against
HB+DB, which is GRS-inspired yet more efficient, bypassing HB+DB’s
proximity-checking measures.
Poor Security/Correctness tradeoff. Section 3.2 shows that the (natural)
tradeoff of security and correctness scales poorly for HB+DB: e.g., for a
false-rejection rate of 1%, HB+DB yields a 26-bit security for 2048-bit keys.
LPN-hardness. Section 3.4 refutes the claim that HB+DB’s passive-security
reduces to the hardness of LPN [16].
Fixing HB+DB. Using these results, we propose a new DB protocol, BLOG,
keeping close to HB+DB. Unlike HB+DB, BLOG attains near-optimal and
provable DB security.
Related work . Our work, and distance-bounding as a whole, are also
related to Secure Neighbourhood Discovery (SND) in ad-hoc networks. SND
aims to allow network nodes to establish neighbour tables. However, wormw-
hole attacks (which involve relaying between malicious nodes) prevent SND
if no trusted parties or additional, physical location data is known [12]. By
contrast, DB protocols take place between only two devices, and a clock
is used to verify the prover’s proximity to the verifier. The feasibility of
distance-bounding has been demonstrated in [17,10].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distance-bounding Security
Secure distance bounding . In distance bounding (DB), the prover au-
thenticates not just by correctly responding to challenges by the verifier,
but also by proving that it is within a time/distance bound of tmax from the
verifier. Besides impersonation security, DB must also guarantee: 1. Mafia-
fraud (MF) resistance: An active MiM attacker cannot authenticate even
if given access to an honest prover. 2. Distance-fraud (DF) resistance: A
malicious prover located outside the verifier’s proximity cannot successfully
authenticate. 3. Terrorist-fraud (TF) resistance: A malicious prover cannot
help a MiM attacker authenticate without allowing the adversary to au-
thenticate arbitrarily afterwards. Notably, DB protocols also thwart relay
attacks, consisting of the exact forwarding of messages between an honest
prover and an honest verifier.
2.2 The LPN problem
Let x be a uniformly sampled k-bit vector. Let η∈ (0,1/2) be a constant
noise parameter and  be an n-bit vector with a Hamming weight smaller
than η ·n, i.e., HW ()≤η ·n. An instance LPNx,η of the LPN problem [2]
involves solving the equation r=(A·x)⊕ in x, given a uniformly-sampled
n×k binary matrix A and the n-bit vector r produced as shown above. For a
matrixA of sub-exponential size (in the security parameter), the best-known
algorithms have a sub-exponential time-complexity to solve LPNx,η [3].
2.3 The HB+ and HB+DB protocols
The HB+ protocol. In HB+, the prover P and the verifier V share two
k-bit long keys x,y. In each session, P and V respectively generate two
bitstrings a and b. P authenticates via several responses r, computed as per
Figure 1. Each r depends on x and y (blinded by a, resp. b), and on a noise
term  selected from a Bernoulli distribution with a public mean η∈(1,12)
(typically, η∈{18 ,14} [14]). The round in Figure 1 is repeated n times.
Verifier V Prover P
x,y∈Z2k x,y∈Z2k,
η∈(0,1/2)
b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b←Z2k
a∈Z2k a−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r
?
=(a•x)⊕(b•y) r←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ←Berη,
r :=(a•x)⊕(b•y)⊕
Fig. 1: One round of the HB+ protocol.
The security of HB+. HB+ guarantees only passively-secure authentica-
tion. An active MiM attacker can impersonate V and send the all-0 bitstring
as a to the prover, thus reducing the HB+ protocol to a one-variable prob-
lem (similar to HB [11]). This MiM can recover y by solving an instance of
LPNy,η formed by the protocol responses [11]. Key-recovery is even easier
by using other MiM attacks, e.g., the GRS attack.
The GRS attack . In this attack, the adversary A intercepts the a values
from the HB+ verifier, chooses δ with a Hamming weight 1, and sends
aˆ := a⊕ δ to P . After forwarding P ’s responses, A awaits the verifier’s
authentication output. If P authenticates despite A’s interference, then
A concludes that the corresponding bit of x is 0; otherwise, the reverse is
assumed to be true. By progressively sending linearly independent δ, A
recovers more bits of x. Once x is learned, A can impersonate P without
knowing y, e.g., by successively sending b=0k.
TheHB+DB protocol . Depicted in Figure 2, the HB+DB protocol [15,16]
uses two public parameters: η ∈ (0,1/2) for LPN noise and the mean
ψ∈ [0,1/2] of a Bernoulli distribution for channel noise. The prover P and
the verifier V share three k-bit keys x,y,z. In the initialisation phase, the
Verifier V Prover P
x∈Z2k, y∈Z2k, z∈Z2k, η∈(0, 12 )
fz :Z2k×{1,2,...,n} → Z2k
Initialisation phase
s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s←Z2k
for i∈{1,...,n} : bi=fz(s,i) for i∈{1,...,n}:
bi=fz(s,i);
i←Berη;
ci=(bi•y)⊕i
Distance-bounding phase
for i=1 to n
Start Clock
ai←Zk2 ai−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′i :=(ai•x)⊕ci⊕ζi ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri :=(ai•x)⊕ci,
where ζi∈Z2 denotes the channel-noise
Stop Clock
Verification phase
V accepts if
Σi∈{1,...n}(ai•x)⊕(bi•y)⊕r′i∈ [µ−τ,µ+τ ]
and ∆i≤ tmax for all i∈{1,...,n},
where µ is the expected mean of the variable
Σi∈1,...,n(i+ζi) in non-adversarial conditions,
and τ is a tolerance parameter.
Fig. 2: The HB+DB protocol.
prover P chooses a k-bit string s and, for i∈{1,...,n}, P computes: a k-bit
string bi (computable in several ways, one of which is bi := fz(s,i)); an
“LPN-noise” bit εi chosen from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter η;
and a bit ci :=(bi•y)⊕εi. The verifier V computes bi for the received s. In
each round of the distance-bounding phase, V starts a clock (added from
HB+ into HB+DB), then sends a k-bit string ai to P . The latter sends a
response ri :=(ai•x)⊕ci. The verifier receives the response perturbed by
channel-noise, r′i :=ri⊕ζi (with ζi following a Bernoulli distribution with
the mean ψ). Upon receipt, V stops the clock and stores the round time ∆i.
During the verification phase, V checks that the r′is were within a given toler-
ance from the“noiseless”value (ai•x)⊕(bi•y); this tolerance depends on the
total noise, i.e., V checks that Σi∈{1,...n}(ai•x)⊕(bi•y)⊕r′i∈ [µ−τ,µ+τ ],
where µ is the expected mean Σi∈1,...,n(i + ζi). V also checks that each
∆i≤2tmax, where tmax is HB+DB’s proximity bound.
3 HB+DB’s security shortcomings
The HB+DB protocol [15,16] is essentially a white-box composition of an
authentication protocol (i.e., HB+) and a proximity-checking phase. This
section shows, however, that HB+DB provides neither secure authentication,
nor secure distance bounding. For details, please refer to [4].
3.1 Poor Asymptotic Security in HB+DB
False-acceptance rates in DB are directly proportional to mafia- and distance-
fraud resistance [6]. It is thus paramount to tune DB parameters (e.g., num-
ber of rounds, noise-levels) to yield tight false-rejection and false-acceptance
ratios.
False rejection in HB+DB . The tolerance τ in HB+DB accounts for
the channel and LPN noise, respectively modelled as bits ζi and i, following
Bernoulli distributions with means ν and η. Let S be the random variable
described by
∑n
i=1(i⊕ζi). The mean of this variable S is µ= nα, in which
n is the total number of time-critical rounds and
α :=η+ν−2·η ·ν. (1)
Indeed, an HB+DB response is perturbed iff. exactly one i or ζi val-
ues are 1, i.e., with probability P[ = 1] · P[ζ = 0] + P[ = 0] · P[ζ = 1]
=η ·(1−ν)+(1−η)·ν, which is the value α stated above.
The probability PHB+DBFR of false rejection in HB+DB accounts for the
number of errors lying outside [µ−τ,µ+τ ], namely:
PHB+DBFR =
∑µ+τ
i=µ−τ
(
n
i
)·αi ·(1−α)n−i.
False-acceptance rates in HB+DB . Let r∗i be a random response of
an adversary A (a MiM or a malicious prover) for a time-critical round
i. Let ri be the response V expects in that round, based on ci. Let the
random variable s∗i be defined as follows: s
∗
i :=1 if r
∗
i =ri (A was right), and
s∗i =0 if r
∗
i 6=ri (A was wrong). Since the responses ri are pseudorandom,
P[s∗i =0]=P[s∗i =1]=
1
2 . Let S
∗ be Σis∗i .
The probability PHB+DBFA that A is falsely accepted, thus committing
mafia or distance fraud is:
PHB+DBFA =
∑α·n+τ
i=α·n−τP[S∗= i]=
∑α·n+τ
i=α·n−τ
(
n
i
)(
1
2
)i(
1− 12
)n−i
(2), in which
τ is a fixed ratio of n, as prescribed above.
Tuning HB+DB’s parameters. In this study, we do the following: 1)
we fix PHB+DBFR to a reasonable 1% value; 2) we vary the number of rounds
and the LPN and channel noise values; 3) using these, we select the toler-
ance τ such that PHB+DBFR ≈ 1%, and then we analyse the false-acceptance
probability.
The false acceptance rate (FAR) is the success probability of an adversary
committing a MiM attack, MF, or DF by sending (early) random responses;
the latter was indeed stated by [15,16] as the best strategy for successful DF
against HB+DB. Since HB+DB uses k-bit challenges and 1-bit responses,
attackers should aim to guess responses, rather than challenges.
Concerning noise, Pagnin et al. [16] specifically require a high η value,
since “otherwise the LPN-security is lost” c.f. [16], page 11. Typical LPN
noise parameters [14] are indeed 18 or
1
4 .
HB+DB’s asymptotic MF and DF resistance . Figure 3 shows how
the FAR –as given in equation (2)– varies with noise. Each curve represents
how FAR probabilities (MF/DF resistance) vary with the number of DB
rounds n, for a given choice of η and ν. In Figure 3, we include η∈{14 , 18}
and ν∈{0.05,0.1}.
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Fig. 3: Base 2 log of HB+DB’s false-acceptance rates for n rounds, with
η∈{0.125,0.25} and ν∈{0.05,0.1}.
Our analysis shows that even for largen,HB+DB offers very poor security.
Even with a generous 128 rounds, the FAR varies from 2−5 in the worst
case (η=1/4, ν=0.1) to 2−30 in the best-case scenario (η=1/8, ν=0.05).
Figure 4 shows how poorly the FAR scales when increasing the LPN
noise. We fixed the channel-noise parameter to a common ν = 0.05, and
used n= 128 DB rounds. As η approaches 13 , the (MF or DF) adversary
wins with probability of almost 1, just by sending random responses. In fact,
even at η=0.125, the protocol guarantees only about 30 bits of security.
Fig. 4: Base 2 log of HB+DB’s false-acceptance rates for a fixed n= 128
rounds, ν=0.05, and η in [18 ,
1
3 ].
Comparison with other DB protocols. For a similar requirement of no
more than 1% false rejection rate, and for a channel noise level as high as
0.3, other protocols offer a much higher DF resistance than HB+DB: i.e., 20
bits of security for about 90 rounds for DB1 (q=3) [6] vs. 6 bits of security
for the same number of DB rounds in HB+DB.
Causes and impact . As shown, HB+DB has a poor robustness to noise.
The three main culprits are: (1) the addition of a non-negligible LPN noise; (2)
the verification of a sum of noisy responses rather than of individual values.
Removing LPN-noise from HB+DB . In the case of no LPN-noise,
random response-guessing succeeds if the number of errors is below τ , i.e.,
with the probability of
∑τ
i=0P[S∗= i].
To keep a false rejection rate below 1% with n= 92 and ν = 0.05, an
optimal tolerance τ = 10, i.e., V must tolerate up to 10 errors. For these
parameters, the FAR of HB+DB is around 2−49. Under the same condi-
tions, running DB1 [6] with q=3 yields a significantly better FAR (and
DF/MF-resistance) of 2−90. Moreover, DB1 (with q=3) is computationally
more efficient than HB+DB. Thus, even in the absence of noise, HB+DB
compares unfavourably with other DB protocols.
Our take-away message is: using LPN noise as prescribed by [15,16]
implies unacceptably-low security levels for HB+DB.
3.2 Key-Learning in HB+DB
Besides being a DB protocol, HB+DB runs all threats of authentication
(as it extends HB+), including key-recovery via GRS attacks. Practical
experiments by Pagnin et al. indicate that the verifier’s clock detects MiM
who try to modify a challenge as in GRS, due to delays in demodulating the
challenge before modifying and re-sending it. We now show how to recover
the key without requiring the MiM to demodulate the challenge. Although
viewed as somewhat orthogonal to DB, key-recovery attacks do feature
in most formal DB models [5,8]. We argue that these attacks are relevant
particularly when the recovered key yields an important DB benefit (e.g.,
accessing a sensitive area); in HB+DB, this is all-the-more important, since
recovering just one of its three keys leads to impersonation, i.e., a DB and
an authentication vulnerability.
Our key-recovery attack . We proceed to describe a concrete MiM attack
against HB+DB, featuring an adversary called A.
Assumptions and setting. The HB+DB scheme uses NRZ-encoded, ASK
modulated challenges: each bit is independently encoded into a high- or
low-amplitude signal on the carrier link. We make the following additional
assumptions: (i) during its attack, A can “speak louder” than the verifier,
i.e., send a signal with higher power, drowning out (part of) V ’s message,
and (ii) A knows the time interval between 2 challenges, and the bit period.
These are not strong assumptions, if A plays a MiM role between P and V .
However, condition (i) might only hold in a probabilistic fashion, if different
modulation schemes are used. Additionally, even if the time interval between
challenges is unknown to the attacker a` priori, A can deduce it by observing
one or more sessions.
The attacker’s strategy. Instead of reading and modifying challenges, our
adversary will just inflict a particular value (e.g., 1) onto one challenge bit,
for a given round. To do so, A emits a signal stronger than the verifier’s at
a specific time. The whole attack is mounted in two steps: (a) key-recovery,
when the honest prover is in the verifier’s proximity and the adversary is
close to the verifier; (b) impersonation thereafter.
Key-recovery in HB+DB. With P,A, and V positioned as detailed above,
A now injects a 1 as the bit at position j in each challenge ai received
by P in a given session. Recall that A does so not by bit-flipping, but by
instantaneously emitting a 1 value“more loudly”at the point corresponding
to the j-th bit-period of challenge ai. The prover receives a modified ai, in
which the j-th bit is replaced by a 1. Then, A observes V ’s authentication
output, concluding that the j-th bit of the secret key x is xj = 0 if, and
only if, the authentication is successful. Else, A sets xi to 1. Repeating this
allows A to predict the entire key x.
We analyse A’s success probability. There are two possibilities for each
authentication attempt.
• Ifxj =1, then ri will be erroneous in two cases: if ai,j was originally 0 and was
unaffected by LPN or channel noise; or if ai,j was originally 1, but was affected
by noise. Then the probability that a prover answers wrongly is 12 ·ζ+ 12 ·(1−
ζ)= 12 . The session containing an expected
n
2 , rather than µ errors, causing V
to likely refuse the authentication. In this case, A can deduce that xj =1. In
this case, P is rejected with the same probability that n Bernoulli trials with
mean 12 yield a number of successes outside the interval [n·α−τ,n·α+τ ].
Hence, A guesses the bit of x correctly with probability of exactly 1−PFA.
• If the j-th bit of x is 0, i.e., xj =0, then injecting a 1 in the challenge at
position j does not alter the expected response. The more formal argument
is given in [4].
For random keys, these two scenarii are equiprobable. Hence, the probabil-
ity to recover one bit of x is Pactive= 12 ·(1−PFR)+ 12 ·(1−PFA)=1− PFR+PFA2 ,
if PFR< 12 (if PFR≥ 12 , A learns less information, since V sometimes rejects
honest provers). Note, however, that a protocol with a correctness lower
than 12 is not practical. Lowering the false acceptance rate, e.g., by using
more DB rounds or higher LPN noise, inevitably leads to easier key recovery.
This is discussed below.
Feasibility and HB+DB correctness. Given its instantaneous bit-
changes, our attack bypasses the experimental results of [16,15]. In order
to understand the attack’s consequences, we analyse its impact on the
(optimal) security parameters.
Key-recovery vs. FRR. Our attack allows A to recover one bit of x with
probability Pactive = 1− PFR+PFA2 . Since PFA and Pactive vary in opposite
directions, the protocol’s security is optimal when PFA=Pactive.
Fig. 5: The lower bound for the best attack probability on HB+DB for
PFR=0.01 and k sessions, for each key size k.
Recovering one bit of the key. By solving PFA = Pactive, we obtain 1−
PFR+PFA
2 =PFA ⇔ 2−(PFR+PFA)=2·PFA ⇔ 3·PFA=2−PFR ⇔ PFA= 2−PFR3 .
Thus, regardless of any further parameter-choices, the adversary can either
authenticate by sending random responses or recover one bit of the key with
a probability p≥ 2−PFR3 . If PFR=0.01, then p≥0.66. Note that this is only a
lower bound on the success probability of the best attack, which is indepen-
dent of the chosen parameters. To lower this probability, one can only increase
the false rejection rate (correctness), making the protocol less practical.
Recovering x. Assume the adversary has access to k sessions, where k is
the size of the key x. The adversary wins if, among these k sessions, it either:
(i) authenticates at least once with random responses, or (ii) recovers x. The
probability that (i) occurs is 1−(1−PFA)k, i.e., 1 minus the chance to fail
k times. The probability (ii) occurs is equal to (Pactive)k =(1− PFR+PFA2 )k.
The two probabilities increase and decrease with p respectively, since k>0.
Where they intersect we have the protocol’s optimal security bound, in-
dependently of the choice of parameters. Figure 5 shows this probability
for a wide range of key-sizes, from 1 to 2048 bits. Even for a 2048-bit key,
HB+DB cannot achieve more than 26 bits of security, while rejecting no
more than 1% legitimate authentication attempts. This makes the protocol
hardly usable in comparison to other DB protocols, which are faster and
provide much better security for much shorter keys.
Quick remedies. Our attack exploits the lack of provable-security anal-
yses against HB+DB. To prevent transcript malleability, transcript-authentication
mechanisms can be added at the end of the protocol.
3.3 On the Key-based Security in HB+DB
We now show that recovering x is sufficient to break both the authentication
and distance-bounding properties of the protocol.
Given the key x output by a key-recovery attackerA, an adversaryB starts
a session sid with a far-away, honest P , and a separate session sid′ with V . Its
goal is to make V output 1 at the end of sid′. In the untimed phases of both
sid and sid′, B just relays s from P to V . This is not detected by the verifier’s
clock, since it is a not a time-critical exchange. In the fast phase, B first plays
out its session withP , sending all ai equal to 0 and getting bi ·y+i fromP . We
can safely assume B uses a noise-cancelling device on this stretch (or the two
devices can just be really close). Next, asB receives valid ai values in sid′ (from
V ), it uses x and the values obtained from session sid, namely bi ·y+i for each
i, to construct the expected (ai•x)⊕(bi•y)⊕i responses. Since these are the
responsesV expected,B succeeds with a probability equalling the correctness
of the protocol (with respect to the tolerance threshold and the LPN noise).
Quick remedies. One option is to prevent transcript malleability by au-
thenticating the session transcript. Additionally, note that the key y which
is used in the DB phase adds no extra MiM security; hence, its presence in
the protocol is debatable.
3.4 HB+DB is Not LPN-based
HB+DB’s very high false-acceptance rates (see Section 3.1) are caused
by the protocol’s LPN noise. Pagnin et al., however, require a high noise
parameter to achieve security (see p.11 of [16]). Yet, we show that the
security of HB+DB cannot be reduced to the hardness of LPN.
HB+ and LPN. If an HB+ execution [13] were used in the absence of LPN
noise (i.e., if η=0), then a passive adversary against the protocol would
be faced with a set of linear equations of the form ai •x⊕ bi •y = ri, for
publicly-known ai,bi, and ri values. A passive adversary observing poly(n)
sessions can thus solve this system and break security. This is why HB+
requires a non-zero LPN noise , which ensure that HB+ is as secure against
passive adversaries as the hardness of the LPN instance LPNx,η used within.
HB+DB vs. LPN. Unlike HB+, even a noiseless instance of HB+DB re-
sists passive attacks. This is because a passive adversary against HB+DB
is faced with a set of equations of the form ai•x⊕bi•y=ri, but in which
only ai and ri are public, whilst the bis remain secret, known only to the
honest parties. Thus, bi randomises the padding to ai•x, which turns an
honest execution of HB+DB into a computationally-hard problem for the
observing adversary, without it being based on a hard instance of LPN. This
aspect is formalised in the long-version of this paper [4].
Causes and impact . HB+DB’s security against passive adversaries can-
not in fact be reduced to the hardness of LPN since the bis are only known
to the two honest parties, and not observable by the attacker. Despite the
lack of proofs for HB+DB in [15,16], HB+DB’s security against passive
adversaries is incidentally not lost, relying instead on the pseudorandomness
of the function f .
4 A way to fix HB+DB
We now attempt to fix HB+DB by proposing BLOG: a more lightweight
and a provably-secure DB scheme.
4.1 The BLOG protocol
Next, we show how our design draws from the findings in Sec. 3.
Removing the LPN noise . As explained in Section 3.4 HB+DB gains no
additional security by using the LPN noise; in fact, the latter is detrimental
to HB+DB. So, BLOG adds no noise to time-critical responses.
Removing the key y. Without the LPN-noise, HB+DB’s response be-
comes ri = ai • x⊕ bi • y. Since each bi acts as a one-time-pad to ai • x,
the responses ri will have the same, pseudo-random distribution even by
omitting y, if bi is drawn at random. We thus save n·k bits of storage and
n dot-product computations (in n fast rounds).
Active attacks & the key z. In HB+DB, the key x is susceptible to key
recovery. Whilst adding a transcript-authentication step could thwart that
attack, it makes terrorist-fraud resistance hard to prove. In BLOG, we follow
the recent approach of [1] and replace x by a one-time random string xtemp.
This will prevent adversaries from using partial leakage of xtemp over multiple
sessions. In BLOG, x is used only to generate fresh xtemp values, similarly
to how z used to generate bi in HB+DB. We also remove HB+DB’s key z.
One-bit responses. Following HB+DB, BLOG also uses k-bit challenges
and 1-bit responses; yet, BLOG achieves nearly optimal security bound, in
a provable way.
The BLOG protocol . As depicted in Figure 6, the prover and verifier in
BLOG share only one long-term value x. During initialisation, the prover
picks a random k-bit value s, as in HB+DB protocol, and sends it to V . Both
compute xtemp||b as the output of fx(s), where xtemp is k-bits long and b is
n-bits long. If xtemp=0 (as indicated by its Hamming weight HW (xtemp)),
V aborts the execution; this abort occurs with a probability of only 1
2k
, for
honest provers. The distance-bounding phase consists of n time-critical
Verifier V Prover P
x∈Z2k
fx :Z2k → Z2k
Initialisation phase
s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s←Z2k
(xtemp||b)←fx(s) (xtemp||b)←fx(s)
V halts if HW (xtemp)=0
DB phase
for i=1 to n
Start Clock
ai←Zk2 ai−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri :=(ai•xtemp)⊕bi
calculate ∆i as the
ai–r
′
i RTT time
Stop Clock
Verification phase
V accepts if ∀i∈{1,...,n} :
ri=(ai•xtemp)⊕bi
and ∆i≤ tmax
Fig. 6: BLOG: A DB Protocol Issued From HB+DB.
exchanges. For each round, V picks a k-bit value ai uniformly at random,
starts its clock, and sends ai to P . The prover is expected to reply with
ri=ai•xtemp⊕bi (i.e., the inner-product ai•xtemp xor-ed with the i-th bit of
b); upon receiving this value, V stops its clock and stores the elapsed time∆i.
Finally, in the verification phase, V checks the correctness of the received
ri, and that ∆i≤2tmax for each round, and if so, V returns an accepting bit.
Thus, V accepts if it holds that ∀ni=1((ri=ai•xtemp⊕bi) and (∆i≤ tmax)).
4.2 The security of BLOG
We now outline BLOG’s security properties, proven in [4].
Theorem 1. For the BLOG protocol, if the key x is chosen uniformly and
independently at random and the challenges ai are picked independently and
uniformly at random by the honest verifier, then the following statements
hold.
DF Resistance. BLOG is qV
(
1
2
)n
-distant fraud resistant to any adversary
opening at most qV adversary-verifier sessions.
MF Resistance. If in addition f is a secure PRF, then, for any (qobs, qP,
qV)-mafia fraud adversary A on BLOG, there exists an adversary B against
the security of f s. that P[A wins]≤ (qobs+qP)2 ·2−k+AdvPRFB +qV ·
(
1
2 +
1
2k+1
)n
4+(qobs+qP)·2−k.
TF Resistance. BLOG is SimTF-resistant.
4.3 An Evaluation of BLOG
Complexity & security . BLOG keeps the strong terrorist-fraud resis-
tance of HB+DB’s, while it adds near-optimal mafia- and distance-fraud
security. To our knowledge, BLOG is the only distance-bounding protocol
to exhibit such strong properties while also guaranteeing provable terrorist-
fraud resistance. The DB1 protocol in [6] (for q=3) is the closest to BLOG
security-wise but it is computationally more efficient.
We preserve the k-bit challenge/1-bit response structure of HB+DB.
Since k represents the bit-length of the key, the latter can today be no lower
than, say, 80 bits (to prevent trivial brute-force strategies). So, HB+DB
and BLOG’s computational complexity cannot be easily lowered, which
may mean that their proximity-checks not being as practical.
Channel-noise in BLOG. Our protocol’s security is not modulo noisy
communications. To make BLOG robust to channel-noise, we would change
the verification phase as follows: (1) responses be verified one by one, but only
a fraction l out of n rounds yield correct responses; (2) all responses be within
the time-bound. Then, each bound close to 2−n attained for DF and MiM-
resistance would remain the dominant factor in these resistance-bounds, yet
each would (provably) change to Tail(n,m,1−pnoise), where Tail(n,m,1−
pnoise) is the tail of the binomial distribution, i.e., the probability of at leastm
successes occurring over n trials, and 1−pnoise is the chance of one individual
success hinging on a response-bit b not being flipped due to the channel-noise.
In this noisy case, BLOG’s DF/MF-resistance holds in the DB security
models in [8,5]; these proofs are left to an extended version of this paper.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the recently-introduced HB+DB protocol
suffers from important problems. In particular, HB+DB does not meet its
original goal of thwarting active MiM attacks against HB+. This protocol’s
security scales poorly with its correctness, mostly due to unnecessary LPN
noise, which was claimed to provide security. Our provable-security analysis
of this protocol highlights these flaws and proposes a provably-secure, more
efficient version of HB+DB.
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